In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a distribution is past data. The goal of this paper is to understand how much data is necessary and sufficient to guarantee near-optimal expected revenue.
Our basic model is a single-item auction in which bidders' valuations are drawn independently from unknown and nonidentical distributions. The seller is given m samples from each of these distributions "for free" and chooses an auction to run on a fresh sample. How large does m need to be, as a function of the number k of bidders and > 0, so that a (1 − )-approximation of the optimal revenue is achievable?
We prove that, under standard tail conditions on the underlying distributions, m = poly(k, 1 ) samples are necessary and sufficient. Our lower bound stands in contrast to many recent results on simple and prior-independent auctions and fundamentally involves the interplay between bidder competition, non-identical distributions, and a very close (but still constant) approximation of the optimal revenue. It effectively shows that the only way to achieve a sufficiently good constant approximation of the optimal revenue is through a detailed understanding of bidders' valuation distributions. Our upper bound is constructive and applies in particular to a variant of the empirical Myerson auction, the natural auction that runs the revenue-maximizing auction with respect to the empirical distributions of the samples. To capture how our sample complexity upper bound depends on the
INTRODUCTION
Comparing the revenue of two different auctions requires an analysis framework for trading off performance on different inputs. For instance, in a single-item auction, a secondprice auction with a reserve price r > 0 will earn more revenue than a second-price auction with no reserve price on some inputs, and less on others. Which auction is better?
The conventional approach in auction theory is Bayesian, or average-case, analysis. That is, bidders' valuations are assumed to be drawn from a distribution, and one auction is defined to be better than another if it has higher expected revenue with respect to this distribution. The optimal auction is then the one with the highest expected revenue. The optimal auction depends on the assumed distribution, in some cases in a detailed way.
While there is now a significant body of work on worstcase revenue maximization (see [13] ), a majority of modern computer science research on revenue-maximizing auctions uses Bayesian analysis to measure auction performance (see [12] ). Since the comparison between auctions depends fundamentally on the assumed distribution, an obvious question is: where does this prior distribution come from, anyway?
In most applications, and especially in computer science contexts, the answer is equally obvious: from past data. For example, in Yahoo!'s keyword auctions, Bayesian analysis is used to provide guidance on how to set per-click reserve prices, and the valuation distributions used in this analysis are derived straightforwardly from bid data from the recent past [17] . This is a natural approach, but how well does it work?
The Model
The goal of this paper is to understand how much data is necessary and sufficient to guarantee near-optimal expected revenue. Our most basic model is the following. There are k bidders in a single-item auction. The valuation (i.e., willingness-to-pay) of bidder i is a sample from a distribution Fi. The Fi's are independent but not necessarily identical.
The distribution F = F1 × · · · × F k is unknown to the seller. The "data" comes in the form of m i.i.d. samples v (1) , . . . , v (m) from F -equivalently, m i.i.d. samples from each of the k individual distributions F1, . . . , F k . The seller observes the samples and then commits to an auction A. We call this function from samples to auctions an m-sample auction strategy. The seller then earns the revenue of its chosen auction A on the "real" input, a fresh independent sample v (m+1) from F. We can state our main question as follows.
(*) How many samples m are necessary and sufficient for the existence of an m-sample auction strategy that, for every distribution F in some class D, has expected revenue at least (1 − ) times that of the optimal auction for F?
The expected revenue of an auction strategy is w.r.t. both the samples v (1) , . . . , v (m) and the input v (m+1) -i.e., over m + 1 i.i.d. samples from F. The expected revenue of an optimal auction is w.r.t. a single sample (the input) from F.
The answer to the question (*) could be a function of up to three different parameters: the error tolerance , the number k of bidders, and the set D of allowable distributions 1 . It is clear that some restriction on D is necessary for the question (*) to be interesting: without any restriction, no finite number of samples is sufficient to guarantee near-optimal revenue, even when there is only one bidder.
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Two distributional assumptions that have been extensively used (see e.g. [12] ) are the regularity and monotone hazard rate (MHR) conditions. The former asserts that the "virtual valuation" function vi −
is nondecreasing, where fi is the density of Fi, while the second imposes the strictly stronger condition that
is nondecreasing. The "most tail-heavy" regular distribution has the distribution function Fi(vi) = 1 −
, while the most tail-heavy MHR distributions are the exponential distributions.
To capture how the sample complexity of revenue maximization depends on the set of allowable distributions, we introduce a parameterized condition that interpolates between the regularity and MHR conditions; this condition is also useful in other contexts (Section 4). . The optimal auction for such a distribution earns expected revenue M . It is not difficult to prove that, for every m, there is no m-sample auction strategy with near-optimal revenue for every such distribution -for sufficiently large M , all m samples are 0 w.h.p. and the auction strategy has to resort to an uneducated guess for M .
denote the corresponding virtual valuation function. F is α-strongly regular if
whenever y > x ≥ 0.
For distributions with a differentiable virtual valuation function ϕ, condition (1) is equivalent to dϕ dv ≥ α. Regular and MHR distributions are precisely the 0-and 1-strongly regular distributions, respectively. A product distribution F = F1 × · · · × F k is called α-strongly regular if each Fi is α-strongly regular. In this paper, we take the set D of allowable distributions in (*) to be the α-strongly regular distributions for a parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
Our Results
Our main result is that, for every fixed α ∈ (0, 1], m = poly(k, 1 ) samples are necessary and sufficient for the existence of an m-sample auction strategy that, for every α-strongly regular distribution F, has expected revenue at least (1 − ) times that of an optimal auction.
Both our upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of revenue maximization are significant. For the lower bound, it is far from obvious that the number of samples per bidder needs to depend on k at all, let alone polynomially. Indeed, for many relaxations of the problem we study, the sample complexity is a function of only.
• If there is an unlimited supply of items (digital goods), then the problem reduces to separate single-bidder problems, for which poly( 1 ) samples suffice for a (1 − )-approximation for all regular distributions [8, Lemma 4.1].
• If bidders' valuations are independent and identical draws from an unknown regular distribution, then poly( 1 ) samples suffice for a (1− )-approximation [8, Theorem 4.3] .
• If only a 1 2 -approximation of the optimal expected revenue is required, then only a single sample is required. This follows from a generalization of the Bulow-Klemperer theorem [4] to non-i.i.d. bidders [14, Theorem 4.4] .
Thus, the necessary dependence on k fundamentally involves the interplay between bidder competition, non-identical distributions, and a very close (but still constant) approximation of the optimal revenue.
On a conceptual level, our lower bound shows that designing c-approximate auctions for constants c sufficiently close to 1 is a qualitatively different problem than for more modest constants like 1 2 . For example, previous work has demonstrated that auctions with reasonably good approximation factors are possible with minimal dependence on the valuation distributions (e.g. [6, 14] ) or even, when there is no bidder with a unique valuation distribution, with no dependence on the valuation distributions [7, 8, 18] . Another interpretation of some previous results, such as [5, 6] , is the existence of constant-factor approximate auctions that derive no benefit from bidder competition. Our lower bound identifies, for the first time, a constant approximation threshold beyond which "robustness" and "prior-independence" results of these types cannot extend. Our argument formalizes the idea that, with two or more non-identical bidders, the only way to achieve a sufficiently good constant approximation of the optimal revenue is through a detailed understanding of bidders' valuation distributions and an essentially optimal resolution of bidder competition.
We provide an upper bound on the number of samples needed for near-optimal approximation by analyzing a very natural auction. Recall that for a distribution F that is known a priori, Myerson's optimal auction gives the item to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation ϕi(vi)
, or to no one if all virtual valuations are negative [15] . The empirical Myerson auction is the obvious analog when one has data rather than distributional knowledge: defineFi as the empirical distribution of the samples from Fi, and run the optimal auction forF. 3 We prove that, for fixed α > 0, a variant on the empirical Myerson auction has expected revenue at least (1 − ) times optimal provided it is given a sufficiently large polynomial number of samples. 4 A key aspect in our analysis is identifying the (non-pointwise) sense in which empirical virtual valuation functions approximate the actual virtual valuation functions; this is nontrivial even for the special case of MHR distributions.
Technical Approach
The proofs of our upper and lower bounds are fairly technical, so we provide here an overview of the main ideas. We begin with the upper bound, which roughly consists of the following steps. , the expected quantile of the jth order statistic. Taking a "net" of quantiles and applying standard large deviation bounds shows that all but the top ξ fraction of the empirical quantiles are good multiplicative approximations of their expectations with high probability (w.h.p.); here ξ > 0 is a key parameter that will depend on k, , and α.
2. (Lemma 6.6) Recall that the expected revenue of an auction equals its expected virtual surplus [15] . Myerson's optimal auction maximizes virtual surplus pointwise, whereas our auction maximizes (ironed) empirical virtual surplus pointwise. In a perfect world, we would be able to argue that the empirical virtual valuation functions are good pointwise approximations of the true virtual valuation functions, and hence the expected virtual surplus of our auction is close to that of Myerson's auction. Unfortunately, good relative approximation of quantiles does not necessarily translate to good relative approximation of virtual valuations. The reason is that a virtual valuation function
can change arbitrarily rapidly in a region where the density changes rapidly (even for α-strongly regular distributions).
We instead prove a different sense in which empirical virtual values approximate actual virtual values, work-3 Since the empirical distributions are generally not regular even when the underlying distributions F are, a standard extra "ironing" step is required; see Section 2 for details. 4 Left unmodified, the empirical Myerson mechanism can be led astray by poor approximations at the upper end of the valuation distributions caused by a small sample effect. We prove that excluding the very highest samples from the empirical distributions addresses the problem. ing in the (quantile) domain rather than the range of the virtual valuation functions. Recall that the quantile q(v) is defined as 1−F (v). We show that for a suitable Δ > 0, for all but the top ξ fraction of quantiles in [0, 1], the empirical virtual valueφ(q) is sandwiched between ϕ(q(1 + Δ)) and ϕ(q/(1 + Δ)). (By ϕ(q) we mean ϕ(F −1 (1 − q)).) Since the extent to whichφ approximates ϕ depends on how rapidly the valuation of the distribution function changes as a function of the quantile, the parameter Δ depends (polynomially) on 1/α. 5 3. (Lemma 6.7 and Theorem 6.9) Consider a fixed bidder i. By the previous step, we can lower bound the virtual surplus contributed by a bidder i with a quantile qi = 1 − Fi(vi) outside the top ξ fraction in the empirical Myerson mechanism by the virtual value contributed by i in the optimal auction when it has a quantile of qi(1 + Δ). Or not quite: an additional issue is that the empirical virtual valuation of a different bidder j with quantile qj might be larger than its true virtual value, leading the empirical Myerson auction to allocate to j over the rightful winner i. This subtracts roughly Δ (and not the kΔ one might anticipate) from i's interim allocation probability, but this is not a problem if Δ is sufficiently small.
4. (Lemma 6.2 and Theorem 6.9) By the previous step, we can essentially lower bound the contribution to the empirical Myerson auction due to the expected virtual surplus of bidder i at a given quantile by the contribution to the optimal auction of the same bidder with a slightly lower quantile. This leaves only the revenue derived by the optimal auction on the top ends of the distributions unaccounted for. Here we use the α-strongly regular assumption for a second time, to argue that selling to a single bidder with probability significantly less than at the monopoly reserve leads to significantly less expected revenue. This implies that, provided we take ξ sufficiently small, the unaccountedfor revenue is at most a roughly fraction of the optimal revenue. Because this decrease in revenue may be no more than the decrease in the selling probability raised to the α -for the corresponding selling price could be increasing quickly when α is small, largely compensating for fewer sales -this final step leads to a sample complexity upper bound with exponential dependence on butions and the input). We are unaware of any other lower bounds in auction theory that have this form. Our construction involves taking a base set of "worst-case" α-strongly regular distributions and truncating them at random points. A key observation is that, when such a distribution is truncated at a point Hi, the corresponding virtual valuation function is linear with coefficient α except at the truncation point, where the virtual valuation jumps to Hi. The high-level intuition is that, when confronted with valuations that are higher than those seen in any of the samples, no auction can know whether a high valuation v corresponds to a truncation point (with virtual value v) or not (with virtual value only αv). Properly implemented, this idea can be used to prove that every auction strategy errs with constant probability on precisely the set of inputs that contribute the lion's share of the optimal revenue. The lower bound follows.
Additional Related Work
A few previous works study the convergence of an auction's revenue to the optimal revenue under different limits. These papers generally assume, unlike the present work, that bidders are symmetric and valuations are uniformly bounded from above. Neeman [16] considers single-item auctions with i.i.d. bidders, and quantifies the fraction of the optimal welfare extracted as revenue by the Vickrey auction, as a function of the number of bidders. Segal [19] and Baliga and Vohra [3] prove asymptotic optimality results for certain natural mechanisms when bidders are symmetric, goods are identical, and the number of bidders is large. Goldberg et al. [9] quantify the rate at which their RSOP auction approaches full optimality, with respect to a fixed-price benchmark, as a function of the number of winners under this benchmark.
It is intuitively clear that, by the law of large numbers, for every fixed distribution F, the revenue of the empirical Myerson auction converges to that of the optimal auction provided the number of samples is sufficiently large. The only other paper we are aware of that proves, as we do, sample complexity bounds that apply uniformly to all distributions (subject to a tail condition) is [8] . [8] were motivated by "prior-independent" auctions that use the bids of a random subset of the (i.i.d.) bidders as samples to guide how to set prices for the rest of the bidders. 6 In analyzing these mechanisms, [8] solves the single-bidder version of the central problem studied in this paper. As our results show, the problem is much different and more delicate with many non-i.i.d. bidders.
The problems that we study are clearly reminiscent of sample complexity questions that are common in learning theory (see e.g. [1] ). A key difference is that we are interested only in optimizing a particular objective function (the expected revenue), and not in learning the underlying distribution per se. Differences aside, we expect rich connections between learning theory and auction theory to be developed in the near future (see also [2] ).
Preliminaries.
We begin by reviewing Myerson's optimal auction [15] for the case of known distributions. There are k bidders, and for each bidder Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there is a distribution Fi from which its valuation is drawn.
7
For each buyer Bi, the auctioneer computes a virtual val-
, where fi is the density function corresponding to Fi. It is required that ϕi(v) be an increasing function of v (if this does not hold ϕi can be modified, ironed, so that it does hold, as implicitly explained in the next paragraph). Then the auctioneer essentially runs an analog of a second-price auction on the virtual values of the bids (virtual bids for short): the bidder, if any, with the highest non-negative virtual bid wins the auction and is charged the minimum bid needed to win (or at least to tie for winning). More precisely, let Bi be the winning bidder and let b2 be the second highest virtual bid. Then the price is ϕi −1 (min{0, b2}). We note that ϕi −1 (0) can be viewed as a bidder specific reserve price for Bi; it is also called the monopoly price for Bi.
We can also describe the auction in terms of a revenue function. This also allows for situations where ϕi(v) is not an increasing function of v. The revenue function is computed in quantile space: qi(v) = 1 − Fi(v) is the probability that Bi will have a valuation of at least v. Now we view v as a function of qi. We introduce the expected revenue function, Ri(qi). It is a function of the quantile qi: Ri(qi) = v(qi) · qi is the expected revenue if Bi is the sole bidder and v(qi) is the price being charged. The auctioneer computes the smallest concave upper bound CRi(q) of Ri(q). Now ϕi(v(qi)) is defined to be the negative of the slope of CRi(qi) (this yields an increasing ϕi, which is the same virtual value as before in the case that the earlier ϕi was increasing). At points where there is no unique slope we choose ϕi(q(v)) = lim (r>q)→q ϕi(r). The auction then proceeds as before. Henceforth, overloading notation, we will write ϕi(qi) rather than ϕi(qi(v)).
The Empirical Myerson Auction.
In the empirical Myerson auction, we assume we are given m independent samples from each distribution Fi. The empirical auction treats the resulting empirical distribution as the actual distribution in a Myerson auction; in our variant, a number of the samples with the highest values are discarded. Suppose that the m independent samples drawn from Fi have values vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ . . . ≥ vim. Then to construct the empirical revenue curve, Ri(q), vij is treated as the value at quantile
, meaning we define Ri(
vj. Before constructing the convex hull CRi of Ri we first discard the ξm largest samples, for a suitable ξ > 0, and add the points Ri(0) = 0, Ri(1) = 0. The reason for discarding the largest samples is that if they were present there is a non-negligible probability that they would create a poor approximation at the high value end of the distribution, which is the end that matters the most.
THE RESULTS
We state upper and lower bound results in turn. bidders each having an α-strongly regular distribution, using m independent samples from its distribution for each bidder, the resulting expected revenue satisfies MR
ii. For constant 0 < α < 1,
.
At first sight, these bounds may not seem consistent as α → 0. In fact, they do interpolate smoothly, as can be seen in the full version of the paper.
Our
We prove these two theorems in Sections 6 and 5 respectively. Before that, in the next section, we briefly indicate another application of α-strong regularity.
APPLICATIONS OF STRONG REGULARITY
We believe our definition of α-strongly regular distributions is of independent interest. Almost all previous Bayesian approximation guarantees are one of three types: for all distributions, for all regular distributions, or for all MHR distributions (see e.g. [12] ). Strongly regular distributions interpolate between regular and MHR distributions, and should broaden the reach of many existing approximation bounds that are stated only for MHR distributions and are known to fail for general regular distributions. To prove this point, we mention a couple of examples of such extensions; we are confident that many others are possible.
Hartline et al. [11, Theorem 4 .2] study a revenue maximization problem in social networks, and give a mechanism with approximation guarantee e/(4e − 2) when players' private parameters are distributed according to MHR distributions. The MHR assumption is used to argue that the probability of a sale at the monopoly price is at least 1/e [11, Lemma 4.1]. Our Lemma 6.2 generalizes this to α-strongly regular distributions, and the approximation guarantee in [11] extends accordingly (with the term e replaced by 1/α 1/(1−α) . Hartline and Roughgarden [14, Theorem 3.2] consider downward-closed single-parameter environments and prove that, when bidders' valuations are drawn from MHR distributions, the VCG mechanism with monopoly reserve prices has expected revenue at least 1 2 times that of an optimal mechanism. With α-strongly regular distributions, the approximation guarantee degrades with decreasing α as 1/(1 + 1 α ).
THE LOWER BOUND

Formal Statement.
Fix α > 0 and 0 < δ ≤ 1, where δ is sufficiently small. Also suppose that k/δ ≥ 1/α 1−α (≥ 1/e when α = 1). The setting is a single-item environment. By an auction strategy, we mean a function Σ that takes as input m = k/δ valuation profiles, or "samples" (each sample is a k-vector) and outputs an auction A. In our single-parameter setting, there is no loss of generality in assuming that A is a direct-revelation dominant-strategy incentive-compatible auction [15] . The revenue of an auction strategy on a sequence of m + 1 valuation profiles v (1) , . . . , v (m+1) is defined as that of A on v (m+1) , where A = Σ(v (1) , . . ., v (m) ) is the auction output by the strategy given the first m profiles.
We show that for every auction strategy Σ, there exists a set F1, . . . , F k of α-strongly regular distributions such that the expected revenue of the auction strategy (over the samples and the input) is at most
and 1− (1, 
The Base Distributions.
We identify the worst-case distributions for a given α > 0. Specifically, for v ∈ [0, ∞), consider
The corresponding hazard rate is
with virtual valuation
The Construction.
We define a distribution over distributions. Each bidder i is either type A or type B (50/50 and independently). The distribution of a type A bidder is F α . For a type B bidder i, we draw q uniformly from the interval [0,
δ k ] and set Hi = (F α ) −1 (1 − q). We then define bidder i's distribution Fi as equal to F α on [0, Hi) with a point mass with the remaining probability 1−F α (Hi) at Hi. These distributions are α-strongly regular with probability 1. An important point is that the virtual valuation of a type B bidder is given by
Let qα denote the monopoly price in a 1-bidder auction. By Lemma 6.2, if α < 1, qα ≥ 1/α 1/(1−/α) , and q1 ≥ 1/e.
Lemma 5.1. (Upper Bound on Optimal Revenue). With probability 1 over the Hi's the expected revenue (over v) of the optimal auction (w.r.t. the Hi's) is at most (F α )
, the value corresponding to quantile min{qα,
Proof. First, the expected revenue of the optimal auction is upper bounded by that of the optimal auction for the case where all Hi's are +∞ -i.e., where Fi = F α for every i. (This follows because F α stochastically dominates Fi for any Hi, so an optimal auction for the latter does at least as well for the former.) Second, by symmetry, when bidders valuations are i.i.d. draws from F α , every bidder has the same sale probability q in the (symmetric) optimal auction, and since there is only one item, this sale probability q is at most 1 k . Third, we obtain an upper bound by dropping the constraint of selling only one item and instead optimally selling to each bidder with probability at most min{qα, q}. Fourth, this is precisely k times the revenue of selling to a single bidder with valuation from F α using the posted price (F α ) −1 (max{1 − qα, 1 − q}). Fifth, by regularity, selling to a single bidder with posted price (
} is therefore no better than selling with the posted price (
Overview.
The high-level plan is the following. Fix an arbitrary auction strategy. Think of the random choices in three stages: in the first stage, the Fi's are chosen; in the second stage, m sample valuation profiles v (1) , . . . , v (m) are chosen (iid from F1 ×· · · × F k ); in the final stage, the input v is chosen (independently from F1 × · · · × F k ). We prove that the expected revenue of the auction strategy (w.r.t. all three stages of randomness) is at most 1 − (α, δ) times that of the optimal auction (w.r.t. all three stages or, equivalently, the first and third stages only).
8 Again, 1 − (α, δ) < 1 will be independent of k. This implies that, for every auction strategy, there exists a choice of F1, . . . , F k such that the expected revenue of the auction strategy is at most 1 − (α, δ) times the expected revenue of the optimal auction for the distributions F1, . . . , F k .
Let
, and recall that this is an upper bound on the optimal auction's expected revenue (equivalently, expected virtual surplus) for every choice of F1, . . . , F k . The main argument is the following: there is an event E such that, for every auction strategy:
(i) the probability of E (over all three stages of randomness) is lower bounded by a function g(α, δ) of α and δ only (independent of k); 8 Actually, we prove this about expected virtual surplus rather than expected revenue, but this is equivalent [15] .
(ii) given E, the expected virtual surplus V * of the optimal auction is at least R * ;
(iii) given E, the expected virtual surplus of the auction strategy is at most h(α, δ)V * , where h(α, δ) < 1 is a function of α and δ only.
Since the virtual surplus earned by the optimal auction is at least that of the auction strategy with probability 1, (i)-(iii) imply that the expected virtual surplus (and hence revenue) of the optimal auction exceeds that of the auction strategy by cR * for some c > 0 depending on α and δ. Since OPT is at most R * , on setting (α, δ) = c, this implies the auction strategy's expected revenue is at most 1 − (α, δ) times optimal.
The Main Argument.
To define E, we use the principle of deferred decisions. We can flip the second-and third-stage coins before those of the first stage by sampling quantiles -(m + 1)n iid draws {q (P4) one of the bidders j, is type A, the other is type B (we leave random which is which).
(P5) the type B bidder (from among j, ) has valuation equal to the maximum valuation from its distribution.
Lemma 5.2 (Statement (i))
. the probability of E (over all three stages of randomness) is lower bounded by a function γ(α, δ) of α and δ only (independent of k), where γ(α, δ) = Proof. The following argument applies to α < 1. For α = 1 it suffices to replace √ α in the argument below with p 1/e. We first sample the k quantiles corresponding to the second stage. Elementary computations show that property (P1) holds with probability at least 1 2e δ 2 (independent of α and k). Conditioned on (P1) holding, (P2) holds with probability (1 − √ α) 2 , which is positive since α < 1. (P3) is independent of the first two properties and holds with constant probability of at least 1 e (independent of α, k). (P4) is independent of the first three properties and holds with 50% probability. Conditioned on (P1), (P2), and (P4) (as (P3) is irrelevant), the probability of (P5) equals the probability that a uniform draw from [0, ] (used to determine the Hvalue) is at least the q-value of the type B bidder, which is conditionally distributed uniformly on [
]. This happens with probability
We conclude that all of (P1)-(P5) hold with a positive probability, namely
for α < 1, and
This is a function of only α and δ and is independent of k.
Lemma 5.3 (Statement (ii)). Given E, the expected virtual surplus V * of the optimal auction is at least R * .
Proof. This is straightforward. When E holds, there is a type B bidder with maximum possible valuation Hi and hence, by (4), virtual valuation Hi.
). By definition, every Hi is at least R * * . Since the optimal auction always picks the bidder with the maximum virtual surplus, it earns virtual surplus at least R * * whenever E holds.
For statement (iii), condition on the event E. First, a computation: for α < 1, for c ≥ 1,
While for α = 1,
Lemma 5.4. Conditioned on E, if α < 1, the virtual valuation of the top type B bidder is at least
times that of the top type A bidder, and if α = 1, the virtual valuation of the top type B bidder is at least 1 2 unit larger than that of the top type A bidder. In addition, all other bidders have virtual valuations even lower than the top type A bidder.
Proof. Case 1. α < 1. By properties (P1) and (P2), the valuation of the type B bidder is at least (
) and that of the type A bidder is at most (
). By (5), the valuation of the type A bidder is at most
times that of the type B bidder. By (P5) and (4), the virtual valuation of the type B bidder is at least
times that of the type A bidder.
Here the valuation of the type A bidder is at most 1 2 unit larger than that of the type B bidder (an additive difference), while the virtual valuation of the type B bidder is at least 1 2 unit larger than that of the type A bidder. By property (P1), all other bidders have virtual valuations even lower than the type A bidder.
We've reduced statement (iii) to the statement that, for every auction strategy, conditioned on E, the strategy fails to allocate the item to the optimal bidder -the type-B bidder with its maximum-possible valuation -with constant probability. It suffices to analyze the auction strategy that, conditioned on E, maximizes the probability (over the remaining randomness) of allocating to the optimal bidder -of guessing, from among the two bidders j, that in
), which one is type A and which one is type B. Since the two bidders were symmetric ex ante, Bayes' rule implies that the probability of guessing correctly (given E) is maximized by, for every v (1) , . . . , v (m+1) , choosing the scenario that maximizes the likelihood of the valuation profiles v (1) , . . . , v (m+1) (given E).
Lemma 5.5. Every auction strategy, conditioned on E, allocates to a non-optimal bidder with probability at least 1 3 .
Proof. The only valuations that affect the relative likelihoods of the two scenarios are v (m+1) j and v (m+1) . We already know the optimal bidder is either j or . Property (P3) of event E implies that the m sample valuations from j and are equally likely to be generated under the two scenarios -the distributions of type-A and type-B bidders differ only for quantiles in [0,
and v (m+1) , the posterior probabilities of the two scenarios are not equal. Again, the following argument applies to α < 1, but once again replacing √ α by 1/ √ e handles the case α = 1. The reason is that, conditioned on E, the type-A bidder's valuation is distributed according (
], while the type-B bidder's valuation is distributed according to the smaller of two iid such samples.
9 Thus, assigning the item to the bidder of j, with the lower valuation (in v (m+1) ) maximizes the probability of allocating to the optimal (type-B) bidder. The probability that this allocation rule erroneously allocates the item to the type-A bidder is the probability that a sample for a distribution (the type-A bidder) is smaller than the minimum of two other samples from the same distribution (the type-B bidder), which is precisely 1 3 . Lemma 5.6. The revenue of any sample-based auction strategy is at most the following fraction of an optimal auction's revenue:
2 , if α < 1, and
Proof. Case 1. α < 1. Conditioned on E, every non-optimal bidder has virtual value at most √ α < 1 times that of the optimal bidder, which has virtual value at least R * * ≥ R * . Since E occurs with probability γ(δ, α), and the virtual surplus of the optimal auction is at least that of the auction strategy with probability 1, the expected virtual surplus of the auction strategy is at least 1 3 γ(δ, α)(1 − √ α)R * less than that of the optimal auction. Since R * is an upper bound on the expected virtual surplus of the optimal auction, the expected virtual surplus/revenue 9 In more detail, consider a type-B bidder i and condition on the event that its quantile
] and that its valuation is its maximum possible, which is equivalent to the condition that its fictitious quantile q i that generates its threshold Hi lies in [qi,
]. The joint distribution of (qi, q i ) is the same as the process that generates two iid draws from [
] and assigns qi and q i to the smaller and larger one, respectively. Note that the valuation of the bidder is, by definition, (
of the auction strategy is at most 1 − 1 3
γ(δ, α)(1 − √ α) times that of an optimal auction. Above, all expectations are with respect to all three stages of randomness. To conclude, for every auction strategy, there must exist a choice of distributions F1, . . . , F k (i.e., of the first-stage coins) so that the expected revenue of the auction strategy is at most 1 −
δ 2 times that of the optimal auction. Case 2. α = 1. Conditioned on E, every non-optimal bidder has virtual value at 1 2 unit smaller than that of the optimal bidder, which has virtual value at least ln k ≥ R * . Since E occurs with probability γ(δ, 1), and the virtual surplus of the optimal auction is at least that of the auction strategy with probability 1, the expected virtual surplus of the auction strategy is at least 1 3 γ(δ, 1)(
that of the optimal auction.
Finally, we note that Lemma 5.6 proves (2) and (3). 
THE UPPER BOUND
MRi. ii. CRi ≤ MR for all i. Besides the specified previously, the auction analysis will use four small parameters γ, Δ, η, ξ > 0 whose roles will become clear as we proceed.
Preliminaries
We state several results concerning Myerson's auction with a single buyer. They will be used in the analysis of the kbuyer case. For lack of space we will outline the analysis only for the case 0 < α < 1.
Lemma 6.2. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution with monopoly price r. Let q(r) be the quantile of valuation r in distribution F . For 0 < α < 1, q(r) ≥ α 1/(1−α) .
The next lemma bounds the growth of the value as a function of the quantile. Below, we write f (q), where strictly speaking we mean f (v(q)).
Lemma 6.3. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution with monopoly price r. Let f be the density function for v.
ii. For
Next, we bound the revenue for small quantiles. Recall that CR(q) denotes the convex hull of the revenue function R(q).
Lemma 6.4. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution with monopoly price r. For q ≤ q(r) and 0 < α < 1,
Next, we give a lower bound on the accuracy of samples. This is essentially Lemma 4.1 in [8] . Letq(v) denote the empirical quantile obtained for a value v given the convex hull CR(q) for the revenue functionR(q).
Lemma 6.5. Let F be a regular distribution (not necessarily strongly regular). Suppose m independent samples with values v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vm are drawn from F . Let 0 < γ,ξ < 1 be given. Let tj = 2j−1 2m
. Then, for all v ≤ v ξm , with probability at least 1 − δ,
, and m ≥ 
The main analysis
In the next lemma we will use the parameter ν defined by 1+ν = (1+γ)
2 . To ensure the conditions hold in the lemmas that follow, we will set
), ν = αΔ 2 /12, and hence
. We note that then Δ + ν + νΔ ≤ , as will be assumed later.
We let CR(q) denote the revenue expected by the empirical auction at pricev(q), the predicted value at quantile q, namely revenuev(q) · q. We letφ(q) denote the corresponding empirical virtual value as a function of q. Lemma 6.6. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution. With probability at least 1 − δ:
and αΔ 2 ≥ 12ν;
ii. for all
Proof. We will only prove (i) in this extended abstract. Letq = arg max{q(vj) ≤ q 1+Δ |q(vj)·vj lies on CR}. Note that vj with j = ξm satisfies the condition, soq is welldefined. Letq =q
1+Δ 1+ν
. As CR is concave,
By Lemma 6.5, with probability at least 1−δ, for allq,q ≥ ξ,
and CR(q) ≤q · v(q/(1 + ν)).
Let q0 =q(1 + Δ). Soq = q0/(1 + ν). We will show that with probability at least 1 − δ,
The second inequality follows from the inequalities bounding CR(q) and CR(q) and the third inequality is by (6) . (7) yields the desired result, for using q ≥ q0, we have
where the final equality holds as the slope of the ironed revenue is unchanged in the range [q, q(1 + Δ)] by the definition ofq. It remains to show the first inequality in ( by assumption.
The following lemma, which bounds the integral of the virtual value between the empirical monopoly pricer and the actual monopoly price r, whenr < r will be useful subsequently.
Lemma 6.7. Let F be an α-strongly regular distribution with monopoly price r, revenue CR = r · q(r), and empirical monopoly pricer. Suppose that the conditions of Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6 apply and that Δ ≤ η ≤ 1. Also suppose that 3η(1 − α) ≤ 1. Then, ifr < r, R q(r) q(r)
[−φ(q)] dq ≤ 3ηCR.
Finally, we consider an auction with k bidders, where the ith bidder has an α-strongly regular distribution Fi.
By Lemma 6.6, with probability at least 1−kδ,φi( q 1+Δ ) ≥ φi(q) for all q ≥ ξ(1 + Δ) and all i andφi(q(1 + Δ)(1 + η)) ≤ φi(q) for all q ≥ ξ and all i. Further, with probability at least 1 − kξ, qi ≥ χ for all i. Let E denote this combination of events, which occurs with probability at least (1 − k(δ + ξ)). ) ≥ xi(q) − 3η.
Proof. Assuming E, for a given q ≥ ξ(1 + Δ), the only circumstance in whichxi( q 1+Δ ) ≤ xi(q) is that for some j = i, and for some q , φj(q ) ≤ φi(q) andφi( q 1 + Δ ) ≤φj(q ).
i.e. φj(q ) ≤ φi(q) ≤φj(q ) as φi(q) ≤φi( q 1+Δ
) by assumption. Define qji(q) = arg max q {φj(q ) ≥ φi(q)}. Then, as E holds, as qji ≥ χ, (8) holds only for qji ≤ q ≤ ≥ xi(q) − 3η as Δ ≤ η ≤ 1.
Theorem 6.9. In the empirical Myerson auction with k bidders each having an α-strongly regular distribution, using m independent samples from its distribution for each bidder, for α < 1, the resulting expected revenue satisfies MR ≥ (1 − )MR if m = Ω "`k ´6 +1/α 3 1/α 1 α 9 min{1−α,α} "
. MR + Shtf = MR, so it suffices to show that Shtf ≤ MR.
Let qr i = q(ri), where ri is the reserve price for Bi. In what follows, the expectation is over the randomness in the sampling performed to determine the empirical distributions. Then [−φi(q)] dq i ≤ 6η P i CRi ≤ 6kηMR, using Claim 6.1(ii) for the last inequality.
Finally, we bound the term T = P i
